About Cryptanalysis of One Fully Homomorphic Cryptosystem Based on Factorization Problem

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ID: 61560
2015
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Abstract
We present a known plaintext attack (KPA) on a recently proposed fully homomorphic cryptosystem (FHC), based on the problem of big integers factoring. We show that the considered FHC is insecure against KPA even if only one pair (plaintext, ciphertext) was intercepted by an adversary. The complexity of the proposed KPA depends polynomially on the parameters of FHC and logarithmically on the size of plaintexts space. Also we discuss how ciphertexts only attack (COA) on this FHC may be reduced to KPA.
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Authors Trepacheva, Alina Viktorovna;
Journal bezopasnostʹ informacionnyh tehnologij
Year 2015
DOI
DOI not found
URL
https://bit.mephi.ru/index.php/bit/article/view/61
Keywords
Technology (General) Chemical technology Information technology Science (General) telecommunication computer engineering. computer hardware mathematics information theory

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