About Cryptanalysis of One Fully Homomorphic Cryptosystem Based on Factorization Problem
Clicks: 276
ID: 61560
2015
Article Quality & Performance Metrics
Overall Quality
Improving Quality
0.0
/100
Combines engagement data with AI-assessed academic quality
Reader Engagement
Emerging Content
6.9
/100
23 views
23 readers
Trending
AI Quality Assessment
Not analyzed
Abstract
We present a known plaintext attack (KPA) on a recently proposed fully homomorphic cryptosystem (FHC), based on the problem of big integers factoring. We show that the considered FHC is insecure against KPA even if only one pair (plaintext, ciphertext) was intercepted by an adversary. The complexity of the proposed KPA depends polynomially on the parameters of FHC and logarithmically on the size of plaintexts space. Also we discuss how ciphertexts only attack (COA) on this FHC may be reduced to KPA.
| Reference Key |
trepacheva2015aboutbezopasnost
Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using
SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
|
|---|---|
| Authors | Trepacheva, Alina Viktorovna; |
| Journal | bezopasnostʹ informacionnyh tehnologij |
| Year | 2015 |
| DOI |
DOI not found
|
| URL | |
| Keywords |
Citations
No citations found. To add a citation, contact the admin at info@scimatic.org
Comments
No comments yet. Be the first to comment on this article.