Paying for Protection: Defence Finance and Collective Action in the Holy Roman Empire, c.1560–1610

Clicks: 17
ID: 333995
2026
Article Quality & Performance Metrics
Overall Quality
Not rated
Combines reader engagement with the AI quality analysis. This article has not been analysed, so there is no overall score — reader engagement is measured and shown alongside.
AI Quality Assessment
Not analyzed
Readership in this journal
Emerging

Ranked #12 of 16 articles by views in german history : the journal of the german history society

Most read Least read

Bar heights use a square-root scale.

Mint this article as an NFT
Not yet minted

Create a permanent, verifiable on-chain record of this article on the Scimatic Network. The NFT is held in your Journament account, and you can withdraw it to your own wallet at any time.

5 SUSD one-off · no wallet required
Abstract
In 1521, the Ottomans took Belgrade and with it the key to the kingdom of Hungary. Five years later, the forces of Süleyman the Magnificent routed King Louis of Hungary’s army at Mohács; another three years later, they invested Vienna.1 More by good fortune than design the city held out, but the threat remained. In 1532, the sultan called off a second attack on Vienna only when a relief force mobilized by the Holy Roman Empire approached. Imperial troops under Sebastian Schertlin managed to inflict heavy losses on superior Turkish forces raiding Lower Austria.2 In effect, a stalemate began to take shape: the Ottomans controlled the central part of Hungary along the Danube and the Habsburgs the regions to the north and west, while the voivode of Transylvania ruled what remained of the country in the east (see Fig. 1).3 The Holy Roman Empire, Austrian Habsburg lands and Hungary-Croatia Stalemate meant anything but calm, though. Border raids and low-level warfare remained the order of the day even when truces interrupted major conflict. Periodically serious hostilities did break out, whether motivated by Ottoman expansionism or by the desire to force Charles V or his successors to recognize that the sultan was the only universal monarch of the world.4 Süleyman launched several more attacks on the Habsburg-dominated parts of Hungary, and in 1593 Ottoman conquests in Bosnia triggered the Long Turkish War, which lasted until 1606.5 During these wars, important fortresses would change hands, but from the 1530s the Ottoman onslaught on Central Europe generally ground to a halt.6 All in all, the frontier in Hungary held. This impasse is surprising. The literature emphasizes that while the Ottoman Empire evolved into a fiscal-military state geared to warfare, the Habsburgs in the Holy Roman Empire were labouring under a host of disadvantages. Most of these stemmed from their difficulties raising money, and ultimately from the Empire’s political structure.7 Over the second half of the sixteenth century, the problems grew more pressing. In 1577, the Habsburg government anticipated costs of about 2 million gulden (fl.) per year for the defence of the Hungarian border (not counting the costs of defending Croatia, ruled in personal union with Hungary); thirty years later, they computed a total of 6.7 million.8 The figures are not directly comparable, but it is evident that defence became increasingly costly. The Habsburgs struggled, and they regularly had to bridge shortfalls by taking up loans from banking and merchant firms, towns and the high nobility.9 Still, they managed to mobilize the necessary sums. How was this possible? This article focuses on the contribution of the altogether more than 300 members of the Holy Roman Empire, that is, of the electors, other princes spiritual and temporal, and free cities, collectively known as the imperial estates. Until the 1960s, most historians assumed that they were unwilling to help: Ottoman raids caused widespread devastation in the Austrian lands but were believed to have been of little concern elsewhere.10 Since then, the picture has changed. One of the main results of Winfried Schulze’s seminal research in the 1970s was the finding that the estates proved willing not only to grant financial support for defence, but also to deliver on their commitments.11 Subsequent research has added nuances. In 1993, Maximilian Lanzinner found that large and wealthy estates were more willing to grant subsidies, which were a proportionally heavier burden for the many small and poor territories.12 In 2003, Peter Rauscher stressed that the importance of the imperial estates for the defence of the frontier should not be overstated: not all the money they paid reached the troops in Hungary.13 In general, Schulze’s core findings concerning the willingness of the estates to pay remain uncontested. There is, however, one crucial issue that scholars have never addressed in this context. Defence is a public good, that is, in the economic definition, a good from whose benefits, once it has been provided, no one can be excluded.14 Consequently, no one has an incentive to pay (whereas incentives to pay for private goods exist because consumers can be excluded from using those goods). Not contributing to the costs of maintaining troops and fortresses in Hungary while benefiting from protection—the technical term is ‘free-riding’—clearly occurred. However, it never occurred to an extent that hindered the Empire’s ability to defend itself and maintain its frontier in Hungary-Croatia. This, too, is surprising, especially when viewed through the lens of classic collective-action theory. In the form suggested by Mancur Olson, this theory argues that in large groups, preventing free-riding requires so-called selective incentives: rewards granted to actors who cooperate or penalties imposed on those who fail to do so.15 While we will see that the liabilities of the imperial estates were politically and formally determined, it is not obvious that such incentives existed in the Holy Roman Empire. To be sure, the imperial fiscal (the emperor’s legal representative) did initiate proceedings against estates who failed to pay their dues. However, there seems to have been only one case where he was successful. The emperor never tried to use force and instead resorted to talks and persuasion.16 Interpreting the payments of the estates as voluntary contributions therefore fits the evidence better than viewing them as taxes, which are by definition compulsory and backed by coercion.17 Hence, the question remains: How did the Empire solve the problem that individual estates could benefit from the defence against the Ottomans even if they did not contribute (fully) to that defence? The answer is important for how we interpret the Holy Roman Empire. After all, it is a truth universally acknowledged that no constitution can function unless actors powerful enough to violate it with impunity accept it voluntarily. Historians have therefore long treated the willingness of the estates to pay their defence dues as an indicator of how well the imperial constitution worked.18 Answering this question therefore helps explain why it worked as well—or poorly—as it did. Section I of the article describes how the Empire financed defence between the 1560s and 1600s. Section II introduces the sources for the contributions of the imperial estates and reassesses the size of these payments. Section III presents a quantitative analysis of the factors that influenced the estates’ willingness to pay and an of the Section the the main results and how they answer the question this article is the of the Holy Roman Empire, the imperial estates were to to their the How these were was in the from the an was in the of Charles how many and was to maintain for one for the of Charles on his to where the would This is why the burden for to be in of The was the of was and one and the estates on a key for these into with at and at Until the of the sixteenth century, the imperial with such as the and However, from the they regularly of the Roman called in this to how the estates were to contribute to the defence of the about the the imperial a for the an of the This of the size of the defence contributions of the estates. the 1560s and to the defence against the were granted in and all but the payments of the estates are The not only Roman but also when they were the grant of was to be paid in the one of in three the emperor to the one for the north of the the other for the The would the estates how had to were also for to the imperial estates to by on their the to than those they would to the While the of this article is on the Roman the imperial the also from the of of the into which the Empire was (the Austrian and Habsburg were The of Roman by their as the imperial The other lands of the Austrian Habsburgs the Empire and its also to defence, as did In the contributions from imperial from for in from in other also of the emperor such as the of in and in This to the question of how large the the imperial granted were in not of Roman but of There are several why this question is the was not a but the of more than one years of the second half of the sixteenth century, it whose had been as the of and the of whose the tried in to and and whose with the emperor had or was or and see Fig. up the and in the and the into gulden a that an with The imperial that the would money from members of the Empire those This seems to be why they were on the even when it was as in and In most the economic The estates this at the held at in the that the contributions of should be of their has should pay While they the necessary to by how the of their or had or that the of which to so-called of the the lands were to have by per between and while by per and per by per of the but there are more The imperial granted but many estates that these tried to their estates whose was this and to pay to their The emperor also into talks with estates. the would be that he the imperial fiscal to proceedings against estates who had into in other he would to when the was concerning the of a of the that by of had paid a this serious concerning the of the of his and other an with his was that he should pay instead of the of the to did on The loans up by the Habsburgs the that in the the imperial fiscal of the of to half a of the of as for a to Maximilian had not been by his However, he believed that at the imperial his would not many in the of had the emperor which he against the of and of the and were not only for the who had to of all these but also for the estates. were III of in for paid instead of the of The that if not all, were Most of the they was when the they to the imperial for for from to not only the he from the estates but also the of they to pay their a of when which had paid how the of While only the for the of and the the of the is in a of whose it imperial of all imperial how they are to contribute to the Roman as as be from the and the fiscal The of the a with concerning the of the of more the of and with in the that concern the of and The the of the from which the was and such as which estates were not and which were granted The to a Roman is from sources to how of their liabilities the imperial estates Still, to do we to three about what to as the also estates whose in the Empire was To the about to in the analysis that by the they is This for and that research believed had been off the when it was in but were in by the the that the estates were to the of of the is the Roman they is the one on whose the analysis is than the which the estates when they for to with the emperor the imperial had in of a are In the emperor the of from to which the we accept this we that the paid per of his dues. However, from the of of the his to a per the estates that paid more than what they per of those are assumed to have per of their The to be by the analysis of the by and is, by and per This to a of the which with Schulze’s to the estates paid on per of their we estates from the this However, if we the picture as on and I The is per (see which the of per that Lanzinner found for the to 2 how the paid by the estates were in the between and the payments the of were Roman on How can we explain Roman a of which factors were how with the willingness of the estates to pay helps answer this research suggested that the political of the estates influenced with and princes willing to pay than and imperial In the analysis are by whose is if an to a and is one for imperial cities, another for and a for estates an individual at the imperial is, and spiritual and The and cities, whose a of the cities, held a found that the estates the Ottoman threat the they were from the Turkish that the between an of and the Ottoman in Hungary to whether this their willingness to contribute to fortresses hands, for many no in how and estates took the Ottoman In the analysis this is by one for estates and another for estates. form the the of the the of these change can several while the estates were by the emperor to a those whose did not in or were not There were incentives not to the costs of and of the of the by their Hence, that the against its had good to it to such were and therefore of have that members of with in collectively when they their research has the importance of the that were for in the of Roman was an the of the and their should have motivated those who had been to pay of their defence the of was by all we are about who was in or by can therefore and that poor estates have been willing than to part of their which they on private to a public good however, from the to the are with a large and the of many of managed their than them we are in the However, the Roman with which the estates were can as a for their While it the are with for all and the estates their to their with the that it did we can use a to for whether a was granted in of seems to that such was than when the frontier was calm, that is, when hostilities were to and border 2 the of the The of the analysis is to how the factors in the were with the estates’ Roman While the between and to the Ottoman is how a is to several or at the is, how is to is more this and have that how is with the other to the form this In the the is a Roman is by and The analysis therefore a on the one by the and the as a for factors such as economic which have influenced the of of the are with a with all an picture of the factors the results of a that the and are by the is by using a which of whose as imperial estates was called into question by imperial This not change the results the by whose is the focuses on the how an when one is by a small while is the Interpreting them is therefore are in Roman in on Roman in on Roman in on Roman in on While it was to be that at the imperial would be with it that this was by the most The is at the per which that the that the is to is than per of that the Roman paid by estates were on all than those of estates In if an a had been at the which granted the paid per of its Roman a the of had not the would pay per The of the Roman of all of whether they had or the of a Hence, the between and estates for the in a to how the of fiscal influenced the willingness to pay for a public at imperial Imperial In the political of an also a and imperial were especially to their paid on more than other estates with if the of in paid per of what he the of would pay per Imperial paid on more of their dues than other estates did. the when the is This is a case of an in the of the in the has a on Roman the is not controlled this the of an imperial is an The results when for support the that and imperial were more than other The the that free-riding with from the Hungarian The of that per in the of Roman paid by In if an 300 from the Ottoman frontier the of paid on per a as would pay per to Ottoman Roman estates had a such the estates were on willing to pay about of their defence dues than that were the results other the personal of had no the of Roman the in historians have the sixteenth did not the scholars suggested that and by the of their dues than they the was not for the cities, this is to when the is the the of and the through The of research that and princes were Roman than other estates therefore an is controlled it is evident that estates with a were as willing to pay as those a as that was for how the estates took the of an Ottoman In it did at for their Roman the of the that estates paid on more of their dues than the estates an in by the was with that the burden of defence proportionally more on estates than on and estates The analysis of of estates more it that for the willingness of imperial to pay their did not were more were also little by of estates a the that for their willingness to been at the that granted the and the of warfare were the only factors that the of estates which had been at the that granted the that were influenced by this also had a on spiritual but did not for and estates that had been at the the of was than for most other groups, that was a for dues even for those for in the of the Empire. we the results of the analysis of of which the one of the of the imperial To the that results are by in only those estates that the in to all are to the size of the of with the results in is of the focuses on the in is all Still, for per in the from the Ottoman frontier was with a in of between and than the grant of the paid by were to than those of other estates. became only from when estates began to pay to more than did. the change occurred when Maximilian whose was was by who was a more princes began to pay than their even they did from that is, the so-called War, when II and support to the of the of the been began to Roman in this it had been in How can we explain these at estates the by the as a to at the only part of which they on to the The they were not a for and therefore were not selective incentives in the of Olson, but their was Still, many the to and even those that their part of the to pay for and the of a key in Roman only per of the estates by the had been at the these estates per of the the results the that cities, spiritual and had in that motivated their all had to with the political at the imperial was than that for The had a their was not for a to Roman however, they to their in the through imperial spiritual estates their if a their or or if a them to accept as therefore to the emperor’s against or had proved in the case of estates were in a have stressed their to use the for as a to political or In most this did not the emperor the to but from about the of estates that had to the of of began to the other estates the did not all the for was to the To that all Europe the of the Empire and This on the not only is but who the of all and as all this from the support of the electors, the and have In it was not only their and that had many had from the the of and the of and the of the of and on were also This imperial estates such as which the that a in and to such as which the of in the of the and imperial the of of One of the the which the never was to such in estates were therefore in the emperor not to on the of the as had in the Roman payments were not to they also to the emperor from against their had not to do under Maximilian many as a it became The Empire’s defence a paid to per of the This article how the Holy Roman Empire the to defend itself against the with the of how well the imperial constitution Defence is a public good from whose no one can be and the estates could on the rewards even if they did not as long as did. the Empire proved to increasingly large sums. The that it could do at a of economic of To why free-riding never the defence of the Empire, the how the estates in to the Roman the imperial assumed all estates by the are and excluded imperial the of which the the estates was as the which they were to pay to which the emperor This a of an of per than the in The is that Roman contributions were voluntary and that in where payments are can be as as per if is an indicator of the of the constitution of the Holy Roman Empire, the constitution seems to have worked well than The analysis factors the and the as the the estates to pay more of what they the findings of an as imperial city or spiritual was with that were than those of other members of the Empire. in of payments were from the Ottoman frontier the of is a to this was with Roman to members of the Empire. The findings that the Empire the problem of in a collective-action theory not The of a grant the and all estates at the that had granted the Roman paid a of their than the more estates were those whose were imperial the emperor to their at the imperial spiritual to their from by In these were from which estates could be that is, in the economic definition, to private incentives to is, to the support of the emperor with Roman estates had private when they of the they paid of their liabilities than their estates they at the emperor to recognize their Hence, the that estates paid were not to defence, but were instead a to their in In the Holy Roman Empire the collective-action problem of the public good of by the that the were and because many estates paid for private Hence, while the Empire’s constitution the defence of the at in the it did not because it was it at in because in the public good that was defence with private to Schulze’s the estates paid on per of their liabilities the Roman of to The analysis is on the by the imperial fiscal that that in the from to the estates paid per of these The results not because a but also because the he and I have how we at how the of an individual a grant has been computed in the is the of the imperial of a at is the the Roman of this and the granted by the The the at of who are assumed to have per of their The by grant in are the of these individual are computed in the where the the grant of a at and the total of estates that the the The all between and in has been computed where is the all of to did not his in and in his seems or from a Roman with an of (the of the of all estates he In a he this by the total of Roman granted by the imperial that took between and that is, by that he the total of the paid by the estates the Roman of to with this his as an the between this and the one in the article Schulze’s has the that such as granted by the emperor a had a can be of However, its results are to the a of estates from the In this that in the of estates than the of estates the it in 2 and Schulze’s is because he many estates the not only those that were and but also for the of and for which became to pay in the sixteenth and paid not at all or only in were also it is not whether they were only when at the total of or also when up the contributions of the In it is evident why his to an that is than the in How did the Holy Roman Empire its defence against the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth its political and the incentives for individual estates to This article reassesses the payments by the members of the Empire the so-called granted by imperial between and that research has on estates paid only about per of the they than per as contributions remained high enough to the Habsburg defence of Hungary against Ottoman The article which of estates proved most willing to contribute and several to the Ottoman frontier paid than more and in the imperial that the was with of Imperial cities, estates also more than The article argues that these were motivated not only by concern for but also by a desire to the emperor’s support for their political and The Empire’s defence therefore not because of but because and private in in
Reference Key
openalex_W7223561218 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors Oliver Volckart
Journal german history : the journal of the german history society
Year 2026
DOI
10.1093/gerhis/ghag036
URL
Keywords Keywords not found

Citations

No citations found. To add a citation, contact the admin at info@scimatic.org

No comments yet. Be the first to comment on this article.