Gambling for Re-election

Clicks: 12
ID: 331810
2026
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Abstract
Abstract We show that gambling-style behaviour is important in politics: politicians ‛gamble for re-election‚ in the context of a political leader selection. We exploit unique access to leaked information on MPs' individual decisions in the 2021 leadership election of Germany's centre-right parties. MPs are more likely to vote for a riskier candidate when facing lower re-election chances. These results match the predictions derived from our model of rational risk-taking. Gambling for re-election shows that MPs trade off leaders' expected quality against their riskiness. It provides a new explanation for intra-party dissent, and rationalises why parties may choose low quality leaders.
Reference Key
openalex_W7220896917 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors Alastair Langtry, Niklas Potrafke, Marcel Schlepper, Timo Wochner
Journal the economic journal
Year 2026
DOI
10.1093/ej/ueag127
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