Central Bank Economic Transparency and Managerial Learning

Clicks: 24
ID: 331424
2026
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Abstract
Abstract Central banks increasingly disclose their private information regarding the economy’s current and future state (CBET). Consistent with CBET shifting investors’ collection and pricing of aggregate-level (where managers do not have an information advantage) toward firm-level (where managers do have an information advantage) information, we find that CBET reduces managers’ learning from stock price. The results are (1) pronounced when firms do not provide guidance and when noise trading in firms’ stock is low, and (2) robust to using the 2013–2014 amendments to the Bank of England’s Inflation Report as an exogenous shock. Additional evidence suggests that CBET lowers investment efficiency. (JEL E22, E52, M41)
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openalex_W7220666487 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors
Journal review of financial studies
Year 2026
DOI
10.1093/rfs/hhag089
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