Directing the Labor Market: Shared Directors and Employee Flows

Clicks: 20
ID: 331419
2026
Article Quality & Performance Metrics
Overall Quality
Not rated
Combines reader engagement with the AI quality analysis. This article has not been analysed, so there is no overall score — reader engagement is measured and shown alongside.
AI Quality Assessment
Not analyzed
Readership in this journal
Emerging

Ranked #132 of 209 articles by views in review of financial studies

Most read Least read

Bar heights use a square-root scale. Only the 120 most-read articles are drawn; the journal has 209 in total.

Mint this article as an NFT
Not yet minted

Create a permanent, verifiable on-chain record of this article on the Scimatic Network. The NFT is held in your Journament account, and you can withdraw it to your own wallet at any time.

5 SUSD one-off · no wallet required
Abstract
Abstract Using résumé data on over 20 million U.S. workers, we find that the flow of employees between a pair of firms sharply drops by about 20% during periods in which the firms share a board director. This relationship is stronger in settings where firms have greater potential gains from limiting worker mobility and is most pronounced for higher-skilled employees. Moreover, we find more connected firms have lower rates of internal promotion and no improvements in employee satisfaction. The evidence is consistent with shared directors serving as a mechanism for labor market coordination. (JEL G34, G38, J42, J62, J08, K21, K31, M50)
Reference Key
openalex_W7220651945 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors
Journal review of financial studies
Year 2026
DOI
10.1093/rfs/hhag090
URL
Keywords Keywords not found

Citations

No citations found. To add a citation, contact the admin at info@scimatic.org

No comments yet. Be the first to comment on this article.