Recommendation Design: Can Mediators Implement Correlated Equilibria?

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ID: 329790
2026
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Abstract
Abstract We report results from a novel experiment studying individuals’ ability to act as mediators by designing incentive-compatible recommendation devices for rational robot agents, that is, to implement correlated equilibria. To test the skills required of a successful mediator, we vary both the games played by the agents and the mediator’s objective. Most participants successfully implement correlated equilibria across games, especially in games where coordination yields benefits. Across objectives, however, many participants initially favour fair and efficient devices, even when these properties are not incentivised, suggesting that fairness and efficiency serve as important heuristics in recommendation design.
Reference Key
openalex_W7214363148 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors Mikhail Anufriev, John Duffy, Valentyn Panchenko, Benjamin Young
Journal the economic journal
Year 2026
DOI
10.1093/ej/ueag123
URL
https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueag123
Keywords Keywords not found

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