Sabotage as Industrial Policy

Clicks: 36
ID: 328409
2026
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Abstract
Abstract We characterise sabotage, exemplified by recent US policies concerning China’s semiconductor industry, as trade policy. For some (but not all) goods, completely destroying foreigners’ productivity increases domestic real income by shifting the location of production and improving the terms of trade. The gross benefit of sabotage can be summarised by a few sufficient statistics: trade and demand elasticities and import and production shares. The cost of sabotage is determined by countries’ relative unit labour costs for the sabotaged goods. We find important non-monotonicities: for semiconductors, partially sabotaging foreign production would lower US real income, while comprehensive sabotage would raise it.
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openalex_W7212291753 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors
Journal the economic journal
Year 2026
DOI
10.1093/ej/ueag111
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