A Model of Agency Behavior in Participatory Budgeting: A Resource Dependence Perspective
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ID: 327848
2026
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Abstract
Abstract Based on resource dependence theory, this article theorizes why government agencies adopt citizen proposals in participatory budgeting. Agencies depend on the executive budget office and the legislature for budget approval, which makes them face uncertainty in securing budgets from these political principals. In this context, agencies can adopt citizen proposals to present their requests as reflecting citizen demands, thereby increasing the probability of approval. Building on this logic, this study argues that the greater the uncertainty agencies face in their dependencies on principals, the more likely they are to depend on proposals. This argument is tested using multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression based on citizen proposals (N = 3,609) submitted through Korea’s national participatory budgeting initiative from 2020 through 2023. The results show that agencies with less financial support from the legislature or those with smaller budgets are more likely to adopt proposals, as they face greater uncertainty due to unstable budgetary flows or fewer response options to manage resource instability. Agencies are also more likely to adopt proposals when they previously secured greater funding through proposal adoption, but this effect weakens for larger-budget agencies or those receiving greater legislative support. These findings emphasize the strategic nature of proposal adoption and the role of resource dependence in agency responses to proposals.
| Reference Key |
openalex_W7211966700
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|---|---|
| Authors | Seunghyun Kim |
| Journal | journal of public administration research and theory |
| Year | 2026 |
| DOI |
10.1093/jopart/muag028
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| URL | |
| Keywords | Keywords not found |
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