Conditional Compliance: The Role of Sector and Policy Design in State Sexual Misconduct Policy
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ID: 325541
2026
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Abstract
Abstract The role of principal-agent dynamics in performance and accountability reforms has been a recurring theme in public administration research. Yet, less attention has been dedicated to how the intersection of sector and policy design shapes principal-agent dynamics and subsequent policy outcomes. This study theoretically explores and empirically tests how sector and policy design shape the effects of state legislation that seeks to prevent shirking (mismanagement and underreporting) in the context of sexual misconduct outcomes in U.S. colleges and universities. We code every state policy designed to regulate higher education institutions’ management of sexual misconduct from 2007 to 2018 in the U.S. and leverage a Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood with a staggered difference-in-differences design to identify the effects. Our findings suggest that both sector and policy design matter: public institutions increase reporting in response to prevention policies that promote education and awareness, but prevention policies have no effect on private institutions. Other policies regulating enforcement and infrastructure produce null effects across both sectors. These findings have important implications for principal-agent theory and policy design research on effective methods for reducing shirking in social equity, accountability, and performance reporting.
| Reference Key |
openalex_W7203787302
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|---|---|
| Authors | Jaeyeong Nam, Daniel L. Fay, Emily Boykin, Elizabeth Bell |
| Journal | journal of public administration research and theory |
| Year | 2026 |
| DOI |
10.1093/jopart/muag026
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| URL | |
| Keywords | Keywords not found |
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