Managerial Coordination in Decentralized Markets

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ID: 322921
2026
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Abstract
Abstract Why do some buyers contract directly with producers, while others contract via an intermediary that coordinates assignments and monitors performance? We develop a repeated-game model in which intermediaries aggregate fluctuating demand, lengthening productive relationships and making cooperation easier to sustain. This benefit comes at the cost of double marginalization: an added layer of rents is needed to motivate the intermediary. The trade-off determines which buyers rely on an intermediary and which contract directly. In equilibrium, producers working through intermediaries earn lower, less variable pay but greater job security. Intermediaries expand trade, yet shift its gains from producers to buyers. Managerial coordination also promotes specialization. The framework sheds new light on professional service firms, global sourcing intermediaries, and digital matching platforms.
Reference Key
openalex_W7171628792 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors Duoxi Li, Michael B. Wong
Journal the economic journal
Year 2026
DOI
10.1093/ej/ueag096
URL
https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueag096
Keywords Keywords not found

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