Evidentialism and the epistemic condition on evidence possession

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ID: 320907
2026
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Abstract
Abstract An important question for evidentialism is: what does it take to have evidence? Feldman (2004) and McGrath (2018) argue that evidence possession requires more than psychological access—it must also satisfy an epistemic condition, such as being justified. In this paper, I argue that the epistemic condition either results in a problematic regress or denies internalism unless one distinguishes between two senses of evidence possession. Developing this distinction helps to clarify the structure and nature of our evidence. In particular, it shows that one’s evidence, at a fundamental level, is self-supporting and consists of one’s mental states rather than their propositional contents.
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openalex_W7168277686 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors Kevin Gausselin
Journal The Philosophical Quarterly
Year 2026
DOI
10.1093/pq/pqag037
URL
https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqag037
Keywords Keywords not found

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