Voting Choice

Clicks: 5
ID: 320835
2026
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Ranked #16 of 192 articles by views in review of financial studies

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Abstract
Abstract Traditionally, fund managers cast votes on behalf of fund investors. Recently, there is a shift toward “pass-through voting,” with funds offering investors a choice: delegate votes to the fund or vote themselves. We develop a framework to study the implications of voting choice. While it helps reflect heterogeneous investor preferences, it also shapes the informational content of the vote, and these forces can conflict. When interests are aligned, voting choice improves information aggregation and investor welfare. With preference heterogeneity or costly information, however, it can make investors worse off by weakening informed. (JEL D72, D82, D83, G34, K22)
Reference Key
openalex_W7168160260 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors Andrey Malenko, Nadya Malenko
Journal review of financial studies
Year 2026
DOI
10.1093/rfs/hhag065
URL
https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhag065
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