Regulators and adjudicators: the interplay between trade committees and dispute settlement bodies in the European Union’s Free Trade Agreements

Abstract In advancing its co-operative approach to sustainable development through trade, the European Union (EU) has embedded a sophisticated governance framework in its trade agreements, comprising two pillars: a complex governance pillar anchored in committees and a dispute-settlement pillar. While scholarship has examined these mechanisms normatively, their practical operation and interplay within EU Free Trade Agreements remain understudied. This article addresses this gap by mapping pathway interactions between the two pillars, drawing on case law and committee reports from the post-2006 period. The analysis shows that, rather than adhering to a strict separation of powers, the pillars operate flexibly and dynamically. Four possible interactions were identified: procedural interdependence, dispute prevention, authority, and compliance support. The findings indicate that committees complement, rather than replace, adjudication, engaging with the dispute-settlement pillar across the dispute life-cycle. In clarifying these dynamics, this article advances debates on the EU’s institutional design and its co-operative approach to regulatory cooperation.