Strategic compliance or tolerated unlawfulness? The protection of nationals abroad and the erosion of the jus ad bellum

Abstract The doctrine of the Protection of Nationals Abroad (PNA) remains one of the most contested aspects of the jus ad bellum. Examining state practice from Entebbe and Operation Eagle Claw through to Libya, Afghanistan, Georgia, Crimea, and Ukraine, the article demonstrates that PNA-based claims consistently struggle to satisfy the established requirements governing the exercise of self-defence. At the same time, the international response to such operations has been markedly uneven. Some interventions attract widespread condemnation, while others encounter limited protest or pragmatic toleration despite doubtful legality. To explain this pattern, the article develops a continuum model distinguishing between consensual evacuations, unilateral non-combatant evacuation operations, contested armed rescue missions, and sustained coercive interventions. The article argues that international responses are shaped not simply by abstract legal principles but by the factual and operational characteristics of the intervention itself, including its scale, duration, intensity, and humanitarian framing. Building on this analysis, the article introduces the concept of ‘strategic compliance’ to explain how states may structure and present certain operations in ways that reduce the likelihood of decisive international opposition without necessarily establishing their legality. The central danger identified is therefore not merely the persistence of legally doubtful evacuation practices, but the gradual erosion of the distinction between political toleration and legal acceptance. Preserving that distinction remains essential to maintaining the normative coherence of the prohibition on the use of force.