The Political Implications of Reference-Dependent Preferences,

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ID: 314202
2026
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Abstract
Abstract This paper studies electoral competition over redistributive taxation between a safe incumbent and a risky opponent. With reference-dependent preferences, economically disappointed voters become risk lovers, and hence are attracted by the more risky candidate. We show that the equilibrium can display policy divergence: the intrinsically more risky candidate proposes lower taxes and is supported by a coalition of very rich and very disappointed voters, while the safe candidate proposes higher taxes. This can explain why right-wing populist parties are often supported by economically dissatisfied voters and yet they run on policy platforms of low redistribution.
Reference Key
openalex_W7161815132 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors
Journal journal of the european economic association
Year 2026
DOI
10.1093/jeea/jvag028
URL
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