The Political Implications of Reference-Dependent Preferences,

Clicks: 6
ID: 314202
2026
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Abstract
Abstract This paper studies electoral competition over redistributive taxation between a safe incumbent and a risky opponent. With reference-dependent preferences, economically disappointed voters become risk lovers, and hence are attracted by the more risky candidate. We show that the equilibrium can display policy divergence: the intrinsically more risky candidate proposes lower taxes and is supported by a coalition of very rich and very disappointed voters, while the safe candidate proposes higher taxes. This can explain why right-wing populist parties are often supported by economically dissatisfied voters and yet they run on policy platforms of low redistribution.
Reference Key
openalex_W7161815132 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors Fausto Panunzi, Nicola Pavoni, Guido Tabellini
Journal journal of the european economic association
Year 2026
DOI
10.1093/jeea/jvag028
URL
https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvag028
Keywords Keywords not found

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