Nuclear deterrence and the prevention of war: the case study of India and Pakistan

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ID: 311253
2020
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Abstract
There are a number of existing theories of deterrence, mainly nuclear deterrence, that explain how states avoid the probability of war when they acquire nuclear power. While most theories generally explain how states deter each other, there is also a deterrence debate between the IR scholars Kenneth Waltz and Scott Sagan over nuclear proliferation assuring security and nuclear proliferation increasing the threat of destruction. Similarly, the stability-instability paradox provides how deterrence lowers the likelihood of war, but the minor skirmishes continue. Under these different theories of deterrence, this paper studies the case of deterrence between India and Pakistan, the two nuclear neighbors and adversaries.
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imported_1770373613_6985c1ed2999d Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors Shafaq Sultana Hussain
Journal Journal of Peace and Diplomacy
Year 2020
DOI
10.59111/JPD.001.01.019
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