The “Wall Street Walk” and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice

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ID: 302636
2009
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Abstract
We examine whether a large shareholder can alleviate conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders through the credible threat of exit on the basis of private information. In our model, the threat of exit often reduces agency costs, but additional private information need not enhance the effectiveness of the mechanism. Moreover, the threat of exit can produce quite different effects depending on whether the agency problem involves desirable or undesirable actions from shareholders' perspective. Our results are consistent with empirical findings on the interaction between managers and minority large shareholders and have further empirical implications.
Reference Key
openalex_W3022435380 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors Anat R. Admati, Paul Pfleiderer
Journal review of financial studies
Year 2009
DOI
10.1093/rfs/hhp037
URL
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