A Theory of Board Control and Size

Clicks: 3
ID: 296125
2006
Free PDF
Article Quality & Performance Metrics
Overall Quality
Not rated
Combines reader engagement with the AI quality analysis. This article has not been analysed, so there is no overall score — reader engagement is measured and shown alongside.
AI Quality Assessment
Not analyzed
Readership in this journal
Emerging

Ranked #46 of 192 articles by views in review of financial studies

Most read Least read

Bar heights use a square-root scale. Only the 120 most-read articles are drawn; the journal has 192 in total.

Mint this article as an NFT
Not yet minted

Create a permanent, verifiable on-chain record of this article on the Scimatic Network. The NFT is held in your Journament account, and you can withdraw it to your own wallet at any time.

5 SUSD one-off · no wallet required
Sign in to mint
Abstract
This article presents a model of optimal control of corporate boards of directors. We determine when one would expect inside versus outside directors to control the board, when the controlling party will delegate decision-making to the other party, the extent of communication between the parties, and the number of outside directors. We show that shareholders can sometimes be better off with an insider-controlled board. We derive endogenous relationships among profits, board control, and the number of outside directors that call into question the usual interpretation of some documented empirical regularities. (JEL G34)
Reference Key
openalex_W2004531271 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors Milton Harris, Artur Raviv
Journal review of financial studies
Year 2006
DOI
10.1093/rfs/hhl030
URL
https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhl030
Keywords Keywords not found

Citations

No citations found. To add a citation, contact the admin at info@scimatic.org

Comments

No comments yet. Be the first to comment on this article.