The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development

Clicks: 85
ID: 290821
1995
Article Quality & Performance Metrics
Overall Quality
Not rated
Combines reader engagement with the AI quality analysis. This article has not been analysed, so there is no overall score — reader engagement is measured and shown alongside.
AI Quality Assessment
Not analyzed
Readership in this journal
Popular

Ranked #4 of 21 articles by views in The Journal of Law Economics and Organization

Most read Least read

Bar heights use a square-root scale.

Mint this article as an NFT
Not yet minted

Create a permanent, verifiable on-chain record of this article on the Scimatic Network. The NFT is held in your Journament account, and you can withdraw it to your own wallet at any time.

5 SUSD one-off · no wallet required
Abstract
Journal Article The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development Get access Barry R. Weingast Barry R. Weingast Standford University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Volume 11, Issue 1, April 1995, Pages 1–31, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036861 Published: 01 April 1995
Reference Key
openalex_W2122621376 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors Barry R. Weingast
Journal The Journal of Law Economics and Organization
Year 1995
DOI
10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036861
URL
Keywords Keywords not found

Citations

No citations found. To add a citation, contact the admin at info@scimatic.org

No comments yet. Be the first to comment on this article.