Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design

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ID: 289400
1991
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Abstract
Journal Article Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design Get access Bengt Holmstrom, Bengt Holmstrom Yale University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Paul Milgrom Paul Milgrom Stanford University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Volume 7, Issue special_issue, January 1991, Pages 24–52, https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24 Published: 01 January 1991
Reference Key
openalex_W2149902237 Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors Bengt Holmström, Paul Milgrom
Journal The Journal of Law Economics and Organization
Year 1991
DOI
10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24
URL
https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24
Keywords Keywords not found

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