Covenants without the Sword? Comparing Prison Self-GovernanceGlobally

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ID: 288478
2016
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Abstract
Why does prison social order vary around the world? While many of the basiccharacteristics of prisons are similar globally, the extent and form of informalinmate organization varies substantially. This article develops a governancetheory of prison social order. Inmates create extralegal governance institutionswhen official governance is insufficient. The size and demographics of theprison population explain why inmates produce extralegal governance institutionsin either decentralized ways, such as ostracism, or through more centralizedforms, such as gangs. Comparative analysis of Brazil, Bolivia, England,Scandinavia, and men's and women's prisons in California provideempirical support.
Reference Key
persistent_1761421054_68fd26fef0aee Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors DAVID SKARBEK
Journal ADVANCES IN ARCHAEOLOGICAL PRACTICE
Year 2016
DOI
10.1017/S0003055416000563
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