A critical examination of the ability hypothesis

Clicks: 1
ID: 287152
2020
Free PDF
Article Quality & Performance Metrics
Overall Quality
Not rated
Combines reader engagement with the AI quality analysis. This article has not been analysed, so there is no overall score — reader engagement is measured and shown alongside.
AI Quality Assessment
Not analyzed
Readership in this journal

Ranked #3,437 of 3,757 articles by views in Malay Journal

Most read Least read

Bar heights use a square-root scale. Only the 120 most-read articles are drawn; the journal has 3,757 in total.

Mint this article as an NFT
Not yet minted

Create a permanent, verifiable on-chain record of this article on the Scimatic Network. The NFT is held in your Journament account, and you can withdraw it to your own wallet at any time.

5 SUSD one-off · no wallet required
Sign in to mint
Abstract
This research paper aims to make a modest contribution to the development of philosophical scholarship by inquiring into the soundness of a strong argument defending physicalism from one of its strong challenges: the Ability Hypothesis (AH), which was advanced by David Lewis and vigorously defended by Laurence Nemirow; and the said challenge to physicalism refers to the Knowledge Argument (KA), which was advanced by Frank Jackson. It must be noted that AH can be viewed from two different perspectives, and thus can be interpreted as either: (1) a defense of physicalism or (2) a critique of KA. The difference in these perspectives is important as this research paper uses (2), and thus its arguments only work within the context that AH is a critique of, or an objection to, KA. To do this, AH is examined by qualifying the differences between the conceptions of phenomenal knowledge or qualia as assumed in both KA and AH. For AH to succeed as an objection to KA, it must, first and foremost, faithfully represent the concepts and views put forth by KA. This research paper argues that AH fails in this area as it commits the straw man fallacy by misinterpreting the supposed meaning of “phenomenal knowledge” as put forth by the KA, which allows for possible formulations of the AH showing the fallacy of equivocation, because KA’s original concept of “phenomenal knowledge” was not properly disproved. It must also be noted that this paper is not a defense of KA, for while AH may not be successful in discrediting KA in the context that this paper views it, there may be other insurmountable difficulties that KA faces.
Reference Key
persistent_1760660746_68f18d0a623cc Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors Oquias, Ikko M.
Journal Malay Journal
Year 2020
DOI
DOI not found
URL
https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/etd_masteral/5951
Keywords Keywords not found

Citations

No citations found. To add a citation, contact the admin at info@scimatic.org

Comments

No comments yet. Be the first to comment on this article.