Beyond exemption: Reassessing the moral agency of delusional patients in light of Lisa Bortolotti’s epistemic innocence

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ID: 287141
2025
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Abstract
A patient with delusions forms a belief that is characterized as a fixed belief that is resistant to counterevidence. This kind of belief is a usual criterion for violating the rationality condition, and failing to satisfy this condition authorizes a person to be exempted from moral agency. The prominent views suggest that delusional patients are not moral agents because of irrationality. On the contrary, even though delusional beliefs challenge an agent's capability to deliberate actions according to moral norms, they do not totally diminish the sense of agency. However, this thesis will offer Lisa Bortolotti’s framework of Epistemic Innocence, which could present a middle ground by recognizing the delusional beliefs for a pragmatic assessment of moral agency. As Bortolotti argues, delusional beliefs play a certain role in maintaining the sense of agency that helps the patients fulfill their epistemic goals. Mentally ill patients with delusions are still moral agents by virtue of their epistemically functional beliefs because it helps them retain their sense of agency to conform to moral norms. This thesis will explore how psychiatric delusional disorders challenge the notion of moral agency and how epistemically functional delusions maintain this sense of agency. Through this, it will unveil the rigid conception of agency of delusional patients that will broaden our view on the concepts of epistemology, ethics, and mental health conditions. Keywords: delusional beliefs, epistemology, epistemic functionality, epistemic innocence, ethics, mental health
Reference Key
persistent_1760660712_68f18ce84329e Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors Espuelas, Jade Canieda
Journal Malay Journal
Year 2025
DOI
DOI not found
URL
https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/etdm_philo/9
Keywords Keywords not found

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