Paternalism and Deliberation: An Experiment on Making Formal Rules
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ID: 282687
2025
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Abstract
This paper studies the relationship between soft and hard paternalism by
examining two kinds of restriction: a waiting period and a hard limit (cap) on
risk-seeking behavior. Mandatory waiting periods have been instituted for
medical procedures, gun purchases and other high-stakes decisions. Are these
policies substitutes for hard restrictions, and are delayed decisions more
respected? In an experiment, decision-makers are informed about an impending
high-stakes decision. Treatments define when the decision is made: on the spot
or after one day, and whether the initial decision can be revised. In a general
population survey experiment, another class of subjects (Choice Architects) is
granted the opportunity to make rules for decision-makers. Given a decision's
temporal structure, Choice Architects can decide on a cap to the
decision-maker's risk taking. In another treatment, Choice Architects can
implement a mandatory waiting period in addition to the cap. This allows us to
study the substitutional relationship between waiting periods and paternalistic
action and the effect of deliberation on the autonomy afforded to the
decision-maker. Our highly powered experiment reveals that exogenous
deliberation has no effect on the cap. Moreover, endogenously prescribed
waiting periods represent add-on restrictions that do not substitute for the
cap. Choice Architects believe that, with time, the average decision-maker will
take less risk and -- because of the distribution of Choice Architects' bliss
points -- come closer to Choice Architects' subjective ideal choice. These
findings highlight the complementarity of policy tools in targeting various
parts of a distribution of decision-makers.
| Reference Key |
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|---|---|
| Authors | Max R. P. Grossmann |
| Journal | arXiv |
| Year | 2025 |
| DOI |
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