Knowledge and Freedom: Evidence on the Relationship Between Information and Paternalism
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ID: 282677
2024
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Abstract
When is autonomy granted to a decision-maker based on their knowledge, and if
no autonomy is granted, what form will the intervention take? A parsimonious
theoretical framework shows how policymakers can exploit decision-maker
mistakes and use them as a justification for intervention. In two experiments,
policymakers ("Choice Architects") can intervene in a choice faced by a
decision-maker. We vary the amount of knowledge decision-makers possess about
the choice. Full decision-maker knowledge causes more than a 60% reduction in
intervention rates. Beliefs have a small, robust correlation with interventions
on the intensive margin. Choice Architects disproportionately prefer to have
decision-makers make informed decisions. Interveners are less likely to provide
information. As theory predicts, the same applies to Choice Architects who
believe that decision-maker mistakes align with their own preference. When
Choice Architects are informed about the decision-maker's preference, this
information is used to determine the imposed option. However, Choice Architects
employ their own preference to a similar extent. A riskless option is causally
more likely to be imposed, being correlated with but conceptually distinct from
Choice Architects' own preference. This is a qualification to what has been
termed "projective paternalism."
| Reference Key |
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| Authors | Max R. P. Grossmann |
| Journal | arXiv |
| Year | 2024 |
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