The Dilemma of Intellectual Property Agreements and R&D in Developing Economies: A Game Theory Approach.

This paper models and predicts how the strengthening of intellectual property (IP) protection will impact R&D in developing economies. International agreements such as TRIPs and free trade agreements are enhancing the level of international control on IP. This is changing deeply the R&D environment in developing economies by restraining illegal channels of knowledge accumulation such as imitation, reverse engineering and piracy. An asymmetric and non-cooperative two-stage (R&D-Production) game is proposed to model a developing market where two local firms compete with a more innovative foreign firm. Equilibrium R&D expenditures and profits of the competing firms are compared for different levels of: market technology, technological gaps and IP protection. The proposed model shows clearly that a stringent enforcement of IP agreements will dramatically decrease the innovative abilities of developing economies especially in high technological sectors. The maintain and increase of their R&D skills will not be possible without a reduction of their technological gap and strong incentives to initiate regulatory (or permit tacit) R&D cooperation between local firms.