Strategies to avoid blacklisting: The case of statistics on money laundering.

Clicks: 223
ID: 23301
2019
Article Quality & Performance Metrics
Overall Quality
Not rated
Combines reader engagement with the AI quality analysis. This article has not been analysed, so there is no overall score — reader engagement is measured and shown alongside.
AI Quality Assessment
Not analyzed
Readership in this journal
Steady

Ranked #1,517 of 2,056 articles by views in PloS one

Most read Least read

Bar heights use a square-root scale. Only the 120 most-read articles are drawn; the journal has 2,056 in total.

Mint this article as an NFT
Not yet minted

Create a permanent, verifiable on-chain record of this article on the Scimatic Network. The NFT is held in your Journament account, and you can withdraw it to your own wallet at any time.

5 SUSD one-off · no wallet required
Abstract
Financial and legal entities (e.g. banks, casinos, notaries etc.) have to report money laundering suspicions. Countries' engagement in fighting money laundering is evaluated-among others-with statistics on how often these suspicions are reported. Lack of compliance can result in economically harmful blacklisting. Nevertheless, these blacklists repeatedly become empty-in what is known as the emptying blacklist paradox. We develop a principal-agent model with intermediate agents and show that non-harmonized statistics can lead to strategic reporting to avoid blacklisting, and explain the emptying blacklist paradox. We recommend the harmonization of the standards to report suspicion of money laundering.
Reference Key
ferwerda2019strategiesplos Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors Ferwerda, Joras;Deleanu, Ioana Sorina;Unger, Brigitte;
Journal PloS one
Year 2019
DOI
10.1371/journal.pone.0218532
URL
Keywords Keywords not found

Citations

No citations found. To add a citation, contact the admin at info@scimatic.org

No comments yet. Be the first to comment on this article.