epistemic immodesty and embodied rationality
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Abstract
ABSTRACT Based on Pritchard's distinction (2012, 2016) between favoring and discriminating epistemic grounds, and on how those grounds bear on the elimination of skeptical possibilities, I present the dream argument as a moderate skeptical possibility that can be reasonably motivated. In order to block the dream argument skeptical conclusion, I present a version of phenomenological disjunctivism based on Noë's actionist account of perceptual consciousness (2012). This suggests that perceptual knowledge is rationally grounded because it is a form of embodied achievement - what I call embodied rationality -, which offers a way of dissolving the pseudo-problem of epistemic immodesty, namely, the seemingly counterintuitive thesis that one can acquire rationally grounded knowledge that one is not in a radical skeptical scenario.
| Reference Key |
rollamanuscritoepistemic
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|---|---|
| Authors | ;Giovanni Rolla |
| Journal | research in international business and finance |
| Year | Year not found |
| DOI |
10.1590/0100-6045.2016.v39n3.gr
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| URL | |
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