on the conceptual discontinuity between moral normativity and factuality: a reply to brito

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ID: 222473
2017
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Abstract
Brito (2010) proposes a naturalistic analysis of morality, disagreeing with some authors who postulate an insurmountable is-ought gap. Here, we present his main arguments and advance some criticisms to them. Brito’s strategy consists in grounding the normative notion of ought on volitive notions, like “will” and “want”. In his perspective, to reach the moral level, a will has to be directed to itself and to all other wills. We try to show that this strategy fails, since moral normativity cannot be grounded on subjective phenomena, regardless of the contents of these phenomena. We also show some incoherence in Brito’s ideias about the possibility of is-ought reduction, as he seems to advocate that it is not possible to reduce “ought” to “is” while he also proposes the reduction of oughts to facts about volition.
Reference Key
magalhes2017prometeus:on Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors ;Tiago Magalhães;Marcos Silva
Journal Chemistry & biodiversity
Year 2017
DOI
DOI not found
URL
https://seer.ufs.br/index.php/prometeus/article/view/6348
Keywords
philosophy psychology religionphilosophy (general)

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