auction-based cloud service pricing and penalty with availability on demand

Availability is one of the main concerns of cloud users, and cloud providers always try to provide higher availability to improve user satisfaction. However, higher availability results in higher provider costs and lower social welfare. In this paper, taking into account both the users’ valuation and desired availability, we design resource allocation, pricing and penalty mechanisms with availability on demand. Considering two scenarios: public availability in which the desired availabilities of all users are public information, and private availability in which the desired availabilities are private information of users, and, analyzing the possible behaviours of users, we design a truthful deterministic mechanism with 2-approximation in public availability scenario and a universal truthful mechanism with 1 1 + γ approximation in private availability scenario, where γ is the backup ratio of resources with the highest availability. The experiment results show that our mechanisms significantly improve the social welfare compared to the mechanism without considering availability demand of users.