how believing can fail to be knowing
Clicks: 24
ID: 186044
2010
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Abstract
This paper puts forward necessary and suffficient conditions for knowing, and addresses Timothy Williamson's claims (a) that knowledge is an un-analyzable mental state, and (b) that any such analysis is futile. It is argued that such an account has explanatory motivation: it explains when belief fails to be knowledge.
| Reference Key |
ramachandran2010theoriahow
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|---|---|
| Authors | ;Murali RAMACHANDRAN |
| Journal | central european journal of biology |
| Year | 2010 |
| DOI |
10.1387/theoria.537
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| URL | |
| Keywords |
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