semantic epistemology: a brief response to devitt
Clicks: 158
ID: 179435
2012
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Abstract
In this article, I argue that philosophers’ intuitions about reference are not more reliable than lay people’s and that intuitions about the reference of proper names and uses of proper names provide equally good evidence for theories of reference.
| Reference Key |
machery2012theoriasemantic
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|---|---|
| Authors | ;Edouard Machery |
| Journal | central european journal of biology |
| Year | 2012 |
| DOI |
10.1387/theoria.6223
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