is there a specific experience of thinking?
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ID: 172420
2010
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Abstract
In this paper I discuss whether there is a specific experience of thinking or not. I address this question by analysing if it is possible to reduce the phenomenal character of thinking to the phenomenal character of sensory experiences. My purpose is to defend that there is a specific phenomenality for at least some thinking mental states. I present Husserl's theory of intentionality in the Logical Investigations as a way to defend this claim and I consider its assumptions. Then I present the case of understanding as a paradigmatic case for the phenomenal contrast argument and I defend it against two objections.
| Reference Key |
jorba2010theoriais
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|---|---|
| Authors | ;Marta Jorba |
| Journal | central european journal of biology |
| Year | 2010 |
| DOI |
10.1387/theoria.640
|
| URL | |
| Keywords | Keywords not found |
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