moral beliefs and cognitive homogeneity

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ID: 169593
2018
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Abstract
The Emotional Perception Model of moral judgment intends to account for experientialism about morality and moral reasoning. In explaining how moral beliefs are formed and applied in practical reasoning, the model attempts to overcome the mismatch between reason and action/desire: morality isn’t about reason for actions, yet moral beliefs, if caused by desires, may play a motivational role in (moral) agency. The account allows for two kinds of moral beliefs: genuine moral beliefs, which enjoy a relation to desire, and motivationally inert moral beliefs acquired in ways other than experience. Such etiology-based dichotomy of concepts, I will argue, leads to the undesirable view of cognition as a non-homogeneous phenomenon. Moreover, the distinction between moral beliefs and moral beliefs would entail a further dichotomy encompassing the domain of moral agency: one and the same action might possibly be either genuine moral, or not moral, if acted by individuals lacking the capacity for moral feelings, such as psychopaths.
Reference Key
dolcini2018rivistamoral Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors ;Nevia Dolcini
Journal european polymer journal
Year 2018
DOI
10.4453/rifp.2018.0009
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