wright o myšlienke teórie logického poznania (wright on the idea of theory of logical knowledge )

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ID: 169315
2017
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Abstract
This paper is concerned with Wright’s attempt to say ‘anything‘ about our – presumed – knowledge of the validity of the most fundamental laws of logic. His account of this basic cognitive achievement is not concerned with the first-order question, ‘how might this knowledge be achieved?’, but rather with the second-order task of ‘explaining with what right we claim it’. According to him, in the end, we do not have a real knowledge at this level, but something that is beneath cognitive achievement. In fact, we have only a kind of rational trust, or entitlement; that is ‘beyond doubt but beneath epistemic justification’. At the same time, however, there can be a real theory of logical knowledge, based upon such entitlements.
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Year 2017
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