is compatible the idea of incommensurability with that of scientific progress? some reasons in support of its compatibility [spanish]

Clicks: 285
ID: 168273
2006
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Abstract
The problem of incommensurability and, particulary, the one of the scientific progress, is associated two names: Kuhn and Feyerabend, whose proposals caused than many put in doubt the apparent evidence of the call scientific progress, relativizing its validity to each school or paradigm. In this writing we will show that this type of epistemic relativism —just as convergentist theory of the truth— they lack of philosophical validity and historical and how the idea of scientific progress is compatible with the thesis of the incommensurability beyond the ontosemantics difficulties that it implies. This suppose to leave the the call statement view of the scientific theories and adopt a non-statement view where the intertheoretical relation of approach allows to subsink different non trivial incommensurability and to validate in them the notion oaf scientific progress.
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Authors ;Juan Manuel Jaramillo Uribe
Journal iutam bookseries
Year 2006
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