when tacit is not tacit enough: a heideggerian critique of collins’ “tacit” knowledge

Clicks: 322
ID: 168202
2013
Free PDF
Article Quality & Performance Metrics
Overall Quality
Not rated
Combines reader engagement with the AI quality analysis. This article has not been analysed, so there is no overall score — reader engagement is measured and shown alongside.
AI Quality Assessment
Not analyzed
Readership in this journal
Steady

Ranked #4 of 15 articles by views in banking law journal

Most read Least read

Bar heights use a square-root scale.

Mint this article as an NFT
Not yet minted

Create a permanent, verifiable on-chain record of this article on the Scimatic Network. The NFT is held in your Journament account, and you can withdraw it to your own wallet at any time.

5 SUSD one-off · no wallet required
Abstract
Some of the problems that Harry Collins has faced in his general framework for theorizing tacit and explicit knowledge are, I will argue, due to an inadequate formulation of the problem. It is this inadequacy that has led to pseudo-problems regarding the ‘tacit’ in general. What-is-more, the vehicle for his theory as objectified in ‘strings’ is symptomatic of the problem that his division of tacit and explicit faces. I will argue that the philosophy of Martin Heidegger will give us adequate conceptual tools to re-think Collins’ general framework, to help us understand the origins of these problems, and possibly indicate a way to solve them. To which ends I suggest that either the tacit Collins has in mind is either not truly tacit or it is not tacit enough.
Reference Key
trubody2013meta:when Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
Authors
Journal banking law journal
Year 2013
DOI
DOI not found
URL
Keywords

Citations

No citations found. To add a citation, contact the admin at info@scimatic.org

No comments yet. Be the first to comment on this article.