LEGITIMACY OF CIVIL RESISTANCE – SOME THEORETICAL ASPECTS

In modern constitutional regimes which are considered to be “approximately just” and “approximately democratic” no procedural rule exists which can guarantee that all rights will be protected or will not be breached. Similarly, not even the practical implementation of all rules can guarantee in all cases that they will be acceptable for all social groups and individuals. Even in the most democratic of systems, certain groups or individuals can feel threatened or unjustly deprived in regard to human and democratic rights. Under such conditions, for groups and individuals a fundamental dillema presents itself: loyality or disobedience. In this paper, the author attemps, by analysing the various ways civil disobedience and conscientious objection are manifested as forms of civil resistance, to establish where the legitimate boundaries of such rights of individuals and groups are, and not only in relation to the rights of other citizens but in relation to the basic democratic principle – majority rights. That is, whether the mentioned forms of civil resistance can and may question the basic values of the majority and thereby also the entire constitutional arrangement.