Simulating Market Entry Rewards for Antibiotics Development.
Clicks: 332
ID: 92960
2018
Article Quality & Performance Metrics
Overall Quality
Improving Quality
0.0
/100
Combines engagement data with AI-assessed academic quality
Reader Engagement
Emerging Content
0.3
/100
1 views
1 readers
Trending
AI Quality Assessment
Not analyzed
Abstract
We design an agent based Monte Carlo model of antibiotics research and development (R&D) to explore the effects of the policy intervention known as Market Entry Reward (MER) on the likelihood that an antibiotic entering pre-clinical development reaches the market. By means of sensitivity analysis we explore the interaction between the MER and four key parameters: projected net revenues, R&D costs, venture capitalists discount rates, and large pharmaceutical organizations' financial thresholds. We show that improving revenues may be more efficient than reducing costs, and thus confirm that this pull-based policy intervention effectively stimulates antibiotics R&D.Reference Key |
okhravi2018simulatingthe
Use this key to autocite in the manuscript while using
SciMatic Manuscript Manager or Thesis Manager
|
---|---|
Authors | Okhravi, Christopher;Callegari, Simone;McKeever, Steve;Kronlid, Carl;Baraldi, Enrico;Lindahl, Olof;Ciabuschi, Francesco; |
Journal | the journal of law, medicine & ethics : a journal of the american society of law, medicine & ethics |
Year | 2018 |
DOI | 10.1177/1073110518782913 |
URL | |
Keywords |
Citations
No citations found. To add a citation, contact the admin at info@scimatic.org
Comments
No comments yet. Be the first to comment on this article.