Study on the Influence of Government Intervention on the Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) Services of Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs).

The OHS services of SMEs are still in their start-up stage in China. As such, there is an absence of mature market norms, which in turn makes it difficult to guarantee the quality of OHS services. The government, as the "night watchman" of the market, is supposed to not only involve itself in the regulation of OHS service quality, but also introduce and implement proper regulatory strategies. This paper employs a computational experiment approach to construct an experimental platform based on multiagent interactions. By simulating the OHS service transaction activities of SMEs, this paper takes the perspective of dynamic evolution. From this perspective, we probe into the optimal regulatory strategy covering the positive influence of government punishment, policy supports, and service quality ratings of the OHS services of SMEs. These strategies should be built on the foundation of proper punishment standard and intensity, proper support standard and intensity, and quality rating information disclosure.